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Despite the potential promise of more participatory urban governance, some debates do not 
sufficiently reflect difficult realities. This paper aims to make good on this by maintaining reflexivity 
about tensions.  Drawing on traditions of pragmatism, the paper identifies tyrannies besetting 
understandings of participatory governance. Tyrannies are ways of thinking that developed in 
response to an identified issue, but which fail to live up to their initial promise.  Despite this, those 
particular ways of thinking continue to hold sway.  The paper sets three key tyrannies: the quest for 
authenticity in non-elected representation; assumptions about leadership models; and ‘bottom up’ 
versus ‘top down’ debates. First, despite widespread acknowledgement of the value of lived 
experience in participatory governance, in the quest for authenticity it is simultaneously reified yet 
denied. Second, we question assumed symbiotic alignments between participatory governance and 
ideas of distributed leadership. Third, we present a critique of the fetishization of ‘bottom up’ 
approaches in participatory governance. It concludes with the role of reflexivity in re-negotiating the 
politics of participatory governance. 
 









Many engaged in participatory governance are able to rehearse the theoretical groundings for more 
participatory forms of decision-making.  Indeed, the normative and empirical case for greater 
participation has been cogently made, many times over. Citizen participation has been advocated 
across contexts and regime types, in more democratic as well as more authoritarian systems.  We 
firmly agree with the proposition that a greater diversity of types of expertise ought to be brought to 
bear on complex policy problems. However, behind shiny renderings of the benefits of participatory 
processes, many also recount sorry sagas of misunderstandings, disagreements, misplaced idealism, 
and failed processes. Yet, the debate about participatory urban governance seemingly fails to reflect 
and explicitly articulate some of these realities. Despite the eulogies, critical questions and 
challenges are often ignored and cleansed from academic accounts. As normative participation 
scholars have cautioned, a utopian vision also needs to be realistic and take account of the realities 
(Wright, 2010).  To further the cause, the cause has to be confident enough to acknowledge its own 
blind spots.  In this paper therefore, we ask, what are some of the current challenges in participatory 
governance?  
In thinking about tensions in participatory governance, we use the concept of tyrannies.  By 
tyrannies we mean ways of thinking that developed in response to an identified issue, but which fail 
to live up to their initial promise.  Despite this, those particular ways of thinking continue to hold 
sway.  Each generation of scholars and activists works in the shadow cast by dominant tropes of the 
day, which are themselves responses to previous sets of understandings.  Solutions designed as 
“healthy counter[s]” (Freeman, 1972/3, p. 151) to one problem become rigidified and over-
extended, turning into a new problem to be solved. What makes them tyrannical is that the space 
has not yet been fully created to acknowledge the limits of the idea, at least not within particular 
groups or networks.  We can spot the signals that a tyranny might be present; sage nods of 
agreement in a discussion inside the room, then sotto voce whispers of contradiction once outside.  
Drawing on traditions of pragmatism, we mobilise experiences from research and practice to 
identify some of the tyrannies besetting understandings of participatory governance.  The paper sets 
out propositions around three key tyrannies in debates on participatory governance: the quest for 
authenticity; assumptions about leadership; and ‘bottom up’ versus ‘top down’ debates. First, 
despite widespread acknowledgement of the value of lived experience in participatory governance, 
in the quest for authenticity it is simultaneously reified yet denied. Second, we discuss assumed 
symbiotic alignments between participatory governance and ideas of distributed leadership. Third, a 
discussion of the fetishization of ‘bottom up’ approaches in participatory governance. The 
substantive content of tyrannical modes of thinking changes from era to era, and between contexts. 
 
 
Underlying the core argument is the claim that there is a need to be reflexive in thinking about 
participation, and explicitly articulate presumptions. In doing so, the politics of participatory 
governance can be acknowledged and re-negotiated. 
 
2. What is a tyranny?   
We use the concept of a tyranny as a means of highlighting practices which have purported to have 
challenged existing norms, but which instead have replaced them with new intellectual cul-de-sacs.  
The new ways of thinking are tyrannical when they severely restrict deeper engagement with the 
issue at hand. It may be a truism to say that solving one problem merely creates a new problem to 
be solved. However, the notion of a tyranny also suggests how an idea might preclude the 
development of further thinking.   
Joreen Freeman’s 1970s essay, The Tyranny of Structurelessness, was written out of her 
frustrations about experiences in anarchist feminist collectives. She was responding to debates 
between members about how best to organise in ways which did not ape patriarchal structures.  Her 
argument was that denying hierarchical structures did not make them disappear.  Attempts to do 
away with structures deemed to be oppressive by declaring them obsolete, she argued, simply made 
the problem worse. They still existed, or were re-created, but were not discussed.  These second 
wave feminist theorists were applying the concept to autonomous self-organising citizen groups, 
attempting to put into practice what we might think of now as polycentric forms of decision-making 
and collective action (Ostrom 1996). These settings, and numerous similar attempts before and 
since, are part of the lineage of participatory governance.  
Freeman criticised those who clung tenaciously (p.162) to unrealisable, inappropriately 
generalised and ineffective ideals.  She refers to these dominant ideas as tyrannies. They become 
the empress’s new clothes, or “goddess[es] in [their] own right” (Freeman, 1972/3, p.151).  That is, 
ways of thinking which have become so dominant they serve to inhibit a more critical engagement 
with those challenges.  Theorising participatory governance demands critical and self-reflexive 
modes of thinking.  However, when particular ways of thinking become orthodoxies, they serve to 
limit the space, scale and scope for more profound critical perspectives (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). 
Identification of tyrannies can generate new analytical understandings, or as some have it, 
‘transformation’ (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). 
In developed democracies where the limits and partiality of representative democracy have 
become clearer, an increasingly participative narrative of democracy is being articulated. 
Participation is understood to revive a form of democratic citizenship where ‘an ethos of public 
 
 
responsibility, accountability and authority becomes diffused as a function of the general civic 
culture’ (Boyte, 2005, p.519; see also Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984). Participation is often 
normatively positioned as a panacea, strengthening legitimacy of decision-making (Young 1990), 
solving problems and improving outcomes (Ostrom, 1996). 
Yet, participatory governance is in itself a new orthodoxy (Richardson, Durose and Dean, 
2018), for example, as seen in the lionising of celebrity policy interventions of the moment, such as 
participatory budgeting (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Baiocchi, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007; Smith et al., 2015; 
Beard, Mahendra, and Westphal, 2016), and other democratic innovations (Fung and Wright, 2001; 
2003) like citizen assemblies. A previous generations’ ‘causes célèbres’ (Smith et al., 2015, p. 244) 
are replaced by the latest darling of citizen participation, such as Liverpool’s Turner Prize winning 
Community Land Trust, Granby Four Streets (Thompson, 2015).    
The concept of tyrannies is not primarily an attack on magic bullet policy pronouncements, 
nor on a boosterist best practice literature.  Equally, neither is it primarily a gap in theoretical 
approaches.  Tyrannies can be seen across settings and sectors. In the academic field, where 
challenge, critique and contestation are the currency, there remain lingering traces of repeated 
tropes which act to silence debate at some level.  Practitioners’ awareness of the gaps between 
claims and reality, which are not then articulated, generate the tyranny. They exist despite extensive 
acknowledgement of various forms of hybridity in governance forms (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 
2006; Skelcher and Smith, 2015) and of high levels of contingency or conditionality in social systems 
generally (Dryzek, 2004; Fischer, 2003; Bevir and Kedar, 2008), and in governance particularly (Innes 
and Booher, 1999; Teisman, Gerrits and van Buuren, 2009). 
 
3. Practice- and research-informed thinking  
In thinking about tyrannies in participatory governance, we draw on traditions of pragmatism, which 
advises social scientists to conduct “cooperative search[s] for truth for the purpose of coping with 
real problems encountered in the course of action” (Joas, 1993, p.19). Through surfacing tacit 
knowledge, this intelligence can be brought to bear on contemporary urban problems (Gibson-
Graham, 2008, p. 166). Normative groundings for participatory governance leave open the critique 
that they are naïve to the notion that such having such aspirations is not the same as achieving 
them. Moreover, that participatory governance offers an optimal prescription in a perfect world. 
This emphasis has had the impact of not only generating what has been termed an ‘expectations 
gap’ (Flinders et al. 2016, p. 269) but also foreclosing reflexivity about the political dynamics of 
participatory governance. Our argument here is to position participation as questioning the 
 
 
persistent presumptions about governance and in doing so, keep open the opportunity to 
acknowledge and so continually re-negotiate the politics of participatory governance. 
It has been argued that ‘theory is catching up with practice’ (Perry at al., 2018, p. 191) in the 
field of knowledge production on governance.  Arguably, this is also applicable to the three tyrannies 
discussed here, which arise from an interaction with practice. In what context are we using the term 
‘practice’?  For social scientists, their practice is research and intellectual inquiry – tyrannies here 
manifest themselves as assumptions in their work, research questions, findings and so on.  
Academics can also be practitioners, either as action researchers, academic-activists, or in dual 
professional roles, moving between different positions.  Academics may also act in their non-
professional lives, playing roles themselves as citizens participating in governance.  For actors in 
participatory governance, their practice is their core roles directly related to the governance 
activities they undertake.   
 
4. Tyranny of authenticity in participatory governance: the quest for authenticity 
The first tyranny of participatory governance we consider is about the quest for authenticity in 
unelected representation. When deployed within the often ‘invited’ spaces (Cornwall, 2004, p.1) of 
participatory governance, authenticity can become a tyranny by simultaneously reifying and yet 
denying lived experience.  
Participatory governance is often positioned as a useful complement to representative 
democracy, with ‘the potential to compensate for electoral inflexibilities’ and provide ‘high levels of 
targeted, information-rich representation’ (Disch, 2011). As Urbinati and Warren reflect, ‘… insofar 
as electoral representation works, it does so in conjunction with a rich fabric of representative 
claimants and advocacy within society’ (2008, p. 402).  By engaging with constituencies beyond the 
ballot box, participatory governance is understood to offer a means to more fully connect lived 
experience with decision-making and thus to address the inherently partial nature of electoral 
representative claims.  
The argument here is that quality of representation rests not only on a democratic mandate 
or accountability by election, but on the claim to ‘authenticity’, that participants unlike their elected 
representatives are the ‘real thing’ (Saward, 2005; 2009). These non-elected forms of representation 
premised on authenticity are argued to offer a means of more inclusive representation, an 
opportunity to value the voices of those too often excluded or marginalised in decision-making and 
to make representative democracy more effective. The tyranny here lies in the over-correction.  A 
quest for authenticity reifies independence from formal politics and embeddedness in social 
 
 
networks (Chapman and Lowndes, 2014). Participants are specially targeted who are outside party 
politics, and who are said to be able to make representative claims on the basis of their membership 
of a specific interest network or group. Membership of a social network also implies particular 
identities, and associated direct experiences, which confer experiential expertise on those members.  
However, in practice, the disconnection from formal party politics, and also embeddedness in 
particular sets of interests are used to deny lived experience. Sought out for their authenticity and 
ability to complement political representation, the participants can then be dismissed as 
‘unrepresentative’ because they are unelected and because they represent particularistic interests. 
The very bases for inviting people to participate are subsequently used to question their 
contributions. 
In the context of academic literature on participatory governance, authenticity is understood 
as the basis for non-elected claims to representation (Saward, 2009). Here, authenticity is related to 
the extent to which representative claims are independent from and untainted by the formal politics 
of political parties, elections and legislatures (Saward, 2009, p. 19-20). These non-elected claims 
instead derive legitimacy based upon ‘constant exchange, dialogue, education and adjustment 
between the representative and the represented’ (Saward, 2005, p. 183). As implied, ‘authenticity’ is 
understood as being derived from embeddedness in social networks that ensure that non-elected 
representatives are informed by a wider constituency (Chapman and Lowndes, 2014, p. 276). The 
notion of ‘authenticity’ offers the distinction between the vertical connections of traditional 
accountability that are associated with electoral representation, what Dryzek terms the ‘symbolic’,  
and the horizontal connections that underpin the potential of non-electoral representation, the 
‘substantive’ (Chapman and Lowndes, 2014, p 276; Dryzek, 2002, p. 185-6).  Examples of such non-
elected representative claim-making are in evidence in participatory governance.  For example in 
various multi-agency and multi-sector partnerships with nominated membership for those chosen to 
represent specific constituencies or selected special interest groups – the ‘BME rep
1
.’, ‘voluntary 
sector rep.’, ‘youth rep.’, ‘business association rep.’ and so on.   
‘Authenticity’ may be understood as a tyranny in the following ways. First, ‘authenticity’ is a 
tyranny when it is aligned with the non-electoral representative claims of particular groups or 
interests. As noted, in both theory and practice, priority is given assigned to those individuals or 
groups who can make claims to represent a wider constituency, for example of a community of 
place, issue, interest or identity (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 524). Yet, giving to priority to claims made on 
behalf of a wider constituency opens up participatory democracy as a space for the antecedent 
power of these potentially competing constituencies to be played out, raising the spectre of capture 
                                                            
1
 Rep is a colloquial shortening of term representative 
 
 
by vested interests. The challenges of substantiating the quality of non-electoral representative 
claims, coupled with a hyper-pluralist critique that suggests a proliferation of claims and 
fragmentation of interests that render this approach, at best, outmoded. This situation can often 
lead within participatory governance to ‘unacceptable levels of conflict, stalemate and suboptimal 
policies’ (Sirianni, 2009, 16) rather than the ‘more specific, explicit and flexible’ forms of 
representation that are promised (Chapman and Lowndes, 2014, p. 274).  In short, this 
interpretation of ‘authenticity’ risks simply defaulting to rather than resolving power inequities and 
capture by vested interests. 
Second, ‘authenticity’ is a tyranny when it becomes a means to devalue rather than 
acknowledge the contribution that an individual may offer to participatory governance on the basis 
of their own experience. Due to the fears raised by neo-pluralist critiques, in practice we see an 
over-correction, resulting in the unsatisfactory situations of either over-relying on established 
interests or forcing participants to substantiate their claims to authenticity or be dismissed. For 
example, Saward (2010, pp. 103–4) proposes that ‘authenticity questions’ might seek to establish 
whether the claimant is who they say they are and whether the content of their claims and their 
own character ‘ring true’. It is valuable to challenge those making representative claims - notably to 
differentiate between those who offer a channel for voice and those who may wish to position 
themselves as ‘gatekeepers’ to communities (Pearce, 2011). Many, however, participate on the 
assumption that diverse and wide-ranging engagement with different individuals will be welcomed 
in participatory governance. Some participants put themselves forward, imagining widespread 
engagement with different individuals. Instead, they are unwittingly placed in a position where they 
are expected to legitimate their authenticity and then accused of being un-representative 
(Richardson and Durose, 2013). In the ‘invited spaces’ of participatory governance, the demand to 
‘prove’ authenticity, can often serve as a basis to dismiss lived experience that doesn’t fit with pre-
conceived expectations or pathologises those who raise challenging or awkward questions. For 
example, Aldred has illustrated participants may be pathologised as having ‘entrenched negativity’ 
when raising structurally rooted problems (2011, p. 63). 
This interpretation of authenticity suggests an implied ‘ordering’, positioning some as more 
authentic than others. In practice, this binds authenticity to particular groups, individuals or 
experiences, and devalues or dismisses the experience of those who do not fit or comply with such 
expectations. Policy abounds with the relentless search for ‘real’ or ‘ordinary’ people, suggesting 
that some people are somehow unreal or less real. Whilst this can be articulated as an explicit 
attempt to tap into latent interest in participation that has previously not been realised or to provide 
a space for otherwise underrepresented groups and individuals to have voice (Hansard, 2013). In the 
 
 
context of the ‘invited spaces’ of participatory governance, the quest for authenticity can serve to 
devalue those who do come forward, as illustrated in the widely-used but pejorative phrase, ‘the 
usual suspects’. Furthermore, it perhaps inadvertently gives those who set the terms of the spaces 
of participatory governance the role of policing who is authentic and who is not. Not only can an 
emphasis on ‘authenticity’ lead to an insular, endless and arguably self-defeating quest, but again 
places the power to decide who is in and who is out in participatory governance with those in 
formal, often elected positions. 
 
5. Tyranny of leadership in participatory governance: leadership should be distributed 
Second, we turn to look at the tyranny of leadership.  In participatory governance debates, there is 
an assumed symbiotic alignment between participatory forms of governance, and ideas of 
distributed, shared or adaptive leadership.  Participatory processes are premised on values such as 
diverse voices being heard, collective pooling of expertise and so on.  In many participatory circles, 
facilitative styles of leadership are seen as supporting these processes by not foreclosing decisions, 
creating spaces for discussion, and mirroring the principles being espoused; ‘walking the walk’, and 
modelling ones’ own principles in practice.   
One issue is how far these ideas merely represent idealistic ideals rather than empirical 
realities.  How do distributed models take account of the negotiation of antecedent forms of power, 
historical delineation of relationships, or disparities in resources in participatory governance?  
Seemingly obvious alignments between participatory governance processes and adaptive modes of 
leadership perhaps conceals more than they reveals. As with the original tyranny of 
structurelessness, positing an easy symbiosis between participation and a set of leadership practices 
that emphasise emergence, openness and distribution may hide the underlying dynamics. A second 
set of issues is the degree to which facilitative styles or adaptive models are preferable in 
participatory governance.  Might there be contexts in which there is potential compatibility between 
robust leadership modes and facilitative participatory processes? 
Grey literature on participation, that is, more practitioner-orientated materials, have long 
grappled with the most appropriate methods and principles for how to conduct participatory 
processes, particularly focused on the practice of facilitation of face-to-face events.  After many 
‘turns’ in the literature, including the empirical turn in studies of deliberation, as well as the 
participatory turn generally, there has also been a turn towards micro-practices within participation. 
The reasons for this can be seen if we understand the nature of the challenge that participation 
presents for leadership models.  Participatory processes require sustained relationships between 
 
 
different interests, involving a deliberate intersection of different forms of expertise, including lived 
experience and deliberate inclusion of under-represented voices.  Difference and inclusion in those 
relationships is explicitly valued, or a transformation of relations is sought (Needham and Carr, 2009; 
Robinson and Tansey, 2006). The aims are not to invert or offer another form of hierarchy, but to 
suggest a non-dominating relationship between different forms of expertise (Durose and 
Richardson, 2016). In short, seeking to ensure different forms of expertise are, ‘integrated, not 
annihilated, not absorbed’ (Follett, 1924). Forging sustained relationships, across traditional 
boundaries between governance actors, either within or between different epistemic communities, 
is a challenge. To do so in a way that seeks to not only give voice to, but integrate different forms of 
expertise is even harder. Throw in a necessarily ‘messy’ (Ackoff, 1979; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; 
Polk, 2015) governance context, confronting ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Head, 2008; Head 
and Alford, 2015) and ‘super-wicked’ issues, and the degree of complexity is magnified.  Added to 
this, new modes of governance are not inscribed on a blank canvas but layered on a pre-existing 
world that mediates what is achievable (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). These inherited, inherent and 
inescapable structures can act as constraints on available or viable options; both crowding out but 
also actively working against efforts to introduce change. What then does it mean to lead in this 
simultaneously ambitious yet constrained environment?  
The dynamic, uncertain and complex context that is understood as having informed the rise 
of participation is also seen to have influenced a ‘fundamental reframing of leadership’ (Gronn, 
2002). Earlier theories of leadership which emphasised leadership traits and styles have given way to 
more situational forms of leadership (Bolden, 2011; Spillane, 2006; Bussu and Galanti, 2018) and a 
characterisation of leadership as emergent, open and distributed. Leadership as a situated practice 
(Bolden, 2011; Spillane, 2006; Bussu and Galanti, 2018) then plays a key role in participation to 
negotiate various complexities and tensions of governance, including: setting priorities and clarifying 
shared goals; supporting greater inclusion, particularly with regard to less represented voices, 
fostering communication and public accountability, and encouraging innovation through challenging 
traditional aversions to risk (Bussu and Galanti, 2018).  Within this process, ‘there is openness to the 
boundaries of leadership’ and ‘varieties of expertise are distributed across the many not the few’ 
(Bennett et al. 2003, 7).  Underpinning this shift is the idea that leadership is not the monopoly or 
responsibility of one person or a few select people at the top of a hierarchy, but as a collective social 
process emerging the interactions of multiple stakeholders (Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Bolden, 2011).  
Adaptive leadership models stand in contrast to so-called ‘heroic’ models of leadership as the 
property of individuals, often associated with more didactic styles of hierarchical or shared 
leadership.   
 
 
Post-heroic understandings of leadership across fields and sectors have re-framed 
leadership as about shared responsibilities, a flattening of hierarchies of expertise, as well as about 
emergence and openness rather than narrow or closed dictatorial direction.   The parallel re-framing 
of governance and leadership suggest an easy symbiosis between participation and a situated 
leadership practice that emphasises emergence, openness and distribution. But, the tyranny of 
leadership can be seen in two core issues.  First, regardless of whether one particular mode is 
desirable or not, any aspirations to facilitative styles are not necessarily borne out in practice. Both 
the governance and the leadership literatures are limited in their understanding of the depth of 
challenge in realising such ambitions. A conflation between adaptive styles of leadership and 
participatory governance arguably conceals inequalities that arise due to antecedent power of 
participants and other disparities in resources, as well as formal roles, and current and historical 
relationships. Participation does not start from blank sheet:  “whilst leadership may be ‘distributed’, 
power often is not” (Bolden, 2011, p.260). Despite their critical grounding, existing literatures on 
both leadership and co-production tend to be normatively-driven, with an insufficient and often 
apolitical approach to the dynamics of power (Bolden, 2011; Flinders et al. 2016). Notwithstanding 
good intentions, shifting from ‘old’ to ‘new’ is a challenge. Even with increasing acknowledgement of 
the limits of ‘traditional’ modes of either participatory governance or leadership, it not only remains 
incredibly difficult to enact change and a difference in views on the appeal or extent of desirable 
change is likely to be encountered. Contemporary notions of leadership may be responding to a 
demand rather than offering an accurate account of how leadership occurs (Bolden, 2011, p. 254). 
Side-stepping these issues is part of the tyranny, and risks exacerbating or re-producing existing 
inequities and legitimising the domination of particular groups.  
Second, the under-explored issue is whether facilitative styles or adaptive models are 
preferable in participatory governance.  A conflation between adaptive leadership and participation 
does not just conceal inequalities, it may simply be the wrong conflation.  For example, despite 
espoused incongruity, for some stakeholders, more ‘traditional’ or positional leaders may be seen to 
provide the comfort of clarity, as well as a source of inspiration and direction in participatory 
arrangements.  ‘Traditional’ approaches may offer greater discretion and empowerment.  
Perversely, more adaptive or distributed approaches might stifle or paralyse action.   
Even for those positively disposed towards a more pragmatic, adaptive, informal and 
relational approach to leadership, there are trade-offs to be made between emergence, openness 
and distribution. As Mansbridge (1994) has argued, enlightened versions of coercive power are 
sometimes necessary. While she was writing about much larger-scale processes, institutions and 
concepts, participatory governance is, in many places, part of this larger whole, and is attempting to 
 
 
improve democratic systems. Yet, it is still largely an anathema to publically or openly suggest these 
modes of leadership in participatory processes. The use of coercion will always involve some 
unfairness (p.60), and: “can never meet an uncontestable standard of procedural fairness, to be fully 
and unquestionably legitimate in the normative sense.” (Mansbridge, 1994, p.53). But, the flipside of 
this issue is equally problematic.  In the tyranny of adaptive leadership, there can often be an over-
emphasis on procedural considerations in participation – making sure the process is as transparent 
as possible, that every voice is heard, everyone is included, each participant is aware of and satisfied 
with the process.  The standard of procedural fairness is as fully met as possible.  However, the 
concomitant trade-offs are not as explicitly recognised, such as the slowing down or deferring of 
decisions.  Our own experiences have occasionally been of an interminable process, seemingly as an 
end in its own right, with a frustrating lack of focus on action, leaving participants wishing for some 
judicial application of strategic coercion. 
 
6. Tyranny of ‘bottom up’ is best participatory governance: ‘bottom up’, good, ‘top down’ bad 
The third of the three tyrannies is the fetishization of ‘bottom up’ approaches in participatory 
governance (Perry and May, 2010).  The tyranny of ‘bottom up is best’ is contrasted to the perceived 
failure of ‘top down’ approaches to governance. Our argument it is not the presentation of the 
binary between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ per se that is the issue, but the essentialising of features 
to specific groups of actors or spaces of governance.  
In making this argument, we are not ignoring the high level of nuance in the literature. Many 
writers advocating bottom up approaches would themselves say that these approaches operate on a 
continuum or spectrum with varying degrees of orientation towards state actors.  There is 
recognition in the literature that there are multiple mutual obligations, structural connections, and 
inter-dependencies between state and non-state actors and forms, as well as a proliferation of 
hybrid forms. Governance activities takes place across spheres, and involves mixed sets of 
institutions and actors, state and non-state, in blurred relationships with loose, shared 
responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues, using collective forms of action (Stoker, 
1998).  Another obvious but important qualifier is that the existing literature also understands 
movement between choices of modes or strategies under different contingent circumstances. 
Rather, the analytical problem is with the essentialisation of particular features as being seen as the 
property of specific sets of actors or governance forms and spaces.  We will make the proposition 
that instead of a focus on which institutions offer superior forms of governance goods, instead the 
focus should be on the goods themselves.  The ‘bottom up is best’ tyranny starts with a critique of 
 
 
top down approaches to governance. There is a critique of existing forms of urban governance as not 
fit for purpose, not fully inclusive or just (Fainstein, 2010; Marcuse et al., 2011), nor delivered 
prosperity for the most disadvantaged. 20th century prescriptions of ‘good governance’ and ‘trickle 
down’ have not delivered (Perry and May, 2011) and are insufficient to deal with the contemporary 
‘urban polycrisis’ (Swilling and Annecke, 2012). Pre-occupation with finding an ‘organisational fix’ for 
urban governance has led to a proliferation of different organisational forms. Few have delivered 
fully on promises of democratisation (Davies, 2011; Harvey, 1989; Logan & Molotoch, 2007; Purcell, 
2008). Indeed, participatory governance in practice ‘tend[s] to be the direct inverse of people-driven 
change’ (Eversole, 2010, p. 30). 
The 21st century city has been predicated on a particular form of technocratic and economic 
knowledge that constitutes expertise as residing in elite and professional epistemic communities. 
Political cultures are characterized by relatively stable ‘civic epistemologies,’ or ‘public knowledge 
ways,’ that comprise preferred modes of producing public knowledge and conducting policy 
deliberation (Jasanoff, 2012, p. 9) initiated, or controlled from the ‘top’. Therefore, some see the 
problem partly being generated by ‘top down’ approaches to governances, by elite actors, often 
state actors, in formal or invited spaces. Indeed, there are often unhelpful conflations made 
between top down, formal and state-led or orientated governance activity.  
Critiques of existing forms identify what might be wrong with urban governance, but there 
are as many areas of contestation about alternatives as there are suggestions for alternatives.  An 
emergent informal tier of non-state governance actors working across and between different sectors 
and communities, has been identified, who are experimenting with alternative forms of urbanism 
(Brenner, Marcuse, and Maye, 2012). There is a gap in understanding of parsimonious solutions 
across different contexts to address wicked governance dilemmas (Jones and Ward, 2002; Offe, 
1984), and how there can be a reconnection of local expertise, innovation and creativity in urban 
policy.  Having said that, some common threads can be discerned in amongst the vast array of 
suggestions for how to rectify existing forms.  A key response to perceived failures of top down 
governance has been the counter-claim that, conversely, ‘bottom up’ autonomous mobilisation by 
non-state actors in ‘popular’ spaces should be privileged as a driver for innovation and creativity in 
governance. This tyranny argues that, if the problem is that formal elite institutions and actors have 
not performed the required functions, then they need to be replaced by civic institutions and actors 
(Harvey, 1989; Fainstein, 2010).  Prevailing governance forms can be seen to be part of the problem, 
and in their place are suggested exemplification of utopian alternatives though local practices, which 
subvert existing governance forms and offer ‘new ways of “governing from below”’ (Atkinson, 
Dörfler and Rothfuß,  2018, p. 171 ). 
 
 
The tyranny of top down and bottom up binaries focuses on debates about who are the key 
initiators of innovation and creativity in participatory governance; a professional, trained elite with 
strategic capacity, or an innovative, creative, and experientially-driven bottom up?  Bottom up is 
credited by some as having greater potential to innovate and transform, less fettered by some of the 
institutionalised and politicised path dependences inherent in state-led structures (John, 2014).  
Citizens have been said to have been ‘restless’ and ‘uninvited’ innovators (Hirst, 1994, p. 105).  
Successful coproductive arrangements are often generated out of informal spaces and relationships 
(Fung, 2001) from the bottom.  Experiments in collaborative governance ‘emerge in the civic sphere, 
and transfer to political society’ (Wagenaar and Wood, 2018, p. 158).  Privileging the bottom up 
sphere, they make the claim that ‘innovative potential’ is premised on the origins of initiatives in civil 
society (p. 153).   
Bottom up approaches are said by advocates to be superior ways to enhance social justice or 
voices of marginalised groups, and potentially address conflict, or at least integrate agonistic 
practices into action.  Top down spaces have a consensus-bias, for example the: ‘elevation of 
collaboration…to a paradigmatic value means that collaborative governance has a complicated, 
often confused, relation to conflict’ (Dean, 2018, p.181).  In contrast, citizen resistance is seen as a 
way to offer critique, dissensus, and disruptions to dominant discourses.  Bottom up governance is 
also portrayed as being better able than top down approaches to mobilise civic participation, with 
popular or organic spaces (Cornwall, 2004) seen as better able than invited spaces to attract mass 
participation. Bottom up can activate or mobilise latent participation, for example through its 
emphasis on new forms of political subjectivity, such as ‘everyday makers’ (Bang, 2005).  Renewed 
focus on the ‘everyday’ has potential as a space for radical transformation (Bang, 2005; Cooper, 
2014). Looking at the everyday is argued to overcome the gaps in representative claims of ‘expert 
citizens’ inhabiting invited spaces of top-down governance, who have become increasingly 
disconnected from their original constituencies, and risk being co-opted (Bang, 2005).   
Claims made about the benefits of a bottom up approach are, of course, highly contestable, 
and contested.  The fetishization of bottom up approaches is as problematic as the privileging of top 
down approaches (Perry and May, 2010). A critique of conventional governance forms leads to 
alternative theories of governance which risk reifying the everyday in place of a reification of the 
local state (Davies, 2011). One could equally argue that the multiple experiences of the capture of 
participatory processes by sectional interests lays waste to claims of bottom up governance 
protecting minority voices.  As discussed above, there is a wealth of critique about the partial and 
patchy nature of the representative claims made by civic groups.  Advantages of bottom up are 
bought at the cost of gaps in effective capacity, which require additional inputs to ‘seed’ and 
 
 
develop infrastructure (González and Healey 2005, p. 2066). Some have claimed that the democratic 
mandate and civic leadership status of state organisations are a greater boon to social justice. Top 
down is seen by some as more strategic, with greater capacity to be effective, and more socially just 
by brokering (democratically) between claims.   
The point is not to then adjudicate between these competing claims. The tyranny is precisely 
that a problematic mode of thinking is superseded by an equally problematic mode.  The issue is not 
the debates between the benefits brought by different sets of actors into governance processes.  
Competing claims about benefits of different approaches illustrate the problem. The problem is the 
essentialisation of features of governance to specific sets of actors, and types of governance spaces, 
rather than seeing them as contingent, and generated by equifinal processes. The tyranny is the 
analytical problem of essentialism. Our argument is that the bottom up tyranny unhelpfully conflates 
sets of actors and particular governance spaces with particular institutional logics, such as the focus 
on, or neglect of, wider strategic priorities in decision-making.  Bottom up is best claims sometimes 
also go further, seeing particular sets of actors and configurations of spaces as being associated with 
effective delivery of specific governance functions, such as the protection of minority voices in 
decision-making processes.  How justice is best protected, how effective capacity is achieved in 
participatory governance, and so on - these are live debates which are useful, and need to be 
debated empirically. However, the underlying challenge is to undertake this analysis on the basis 
that we are interested in how governance functions are produced, and the specific forms taken in 
particular cases, rather than seeing different institutional logics or delivery of functions as the 
property of those actors or spaces. So, the issue is not that a reification of the everyday might 
replace a reification of the local state.  Instead, the reification is a result of both positions starting 
from the wrong place, by emphasising the site of governance, rather than the goods produced, and 
therefore essentialising the goods produced to a specific site. Where thinking on governance 
functions becomes tyrannical it is where contingent claims become essentialised into analytical 
features.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusions  
So, where does all this take the debate on participatory governance?  We started our 
discussion of tyrannies with an aim of keeping open the opportunity to acknowledge, and so 
continually re-negotiate, the politics of participatory governance. The promise of participation, 
we would argue, is still good.  But it is a promise on which much is still to be made good. In 
order to do this, we have argued for the maintenance of reflexivity about practices.  Where the 
 
 
dominant ideas about how to do participation get stuck, or become counter-productive, it is 
worth thinking about these issues.  Our goal is to attempt to prevent participatory governance 
from becoming a tainted policy fad, disliked because it has been: ‘stale, over- and misused, 
cynically applied and generative of public cynicism, ineffective, and superficial’ (Durose et al., 
2013). ‘“Participation” can be used as a cloak of words to disguise business as usual: to hide 
power inequities, gloss differences, and enable elites to pursue their own agendas’ (Eversole 
2012, p. 30). Some have reflected on “the new participatory paradigm” in negative terms, for 
example: “experience shows that empowerment measures often disempower; in too many 
cases, democracy is a code word for conformity” (Shaw, 2011, p. ii129).  It is these sorts of 
negative reflections that give rise to the need to regularly refresh paradigms in order to avoid 
sub-optimal outcomes. 
That participation is a panacea is a tyranny in itself, the challenges should not be taken 
as a means to revert to only elected forms, but rather to remain reflexive.  However, as we 
have said elsewhere (Richardson, Durose and Perry, 2019) it is often easier to outline a 
problem than to solve one.  The emphasis in this paper has been on exposition, on the grounds 
that it is a positive step to acknowledge, and further elaborate and articulate key current 
tyrannies in the field. Where might this thinking go next, in considering new practices? We 
consider the specific tyrannies before going on to consider possible implications for 
participatory governance in other contexts. 
 On the first tyranny we identified from our own context, of the quest for authenticity, we 
set out some problems with ways that non-electoral claims to representation have been set up, or 
used.  Proposals for ways to target recruitment or a default to random selection of non-electoral 
participants have many advantages in addressing complex issues of representation and 
accountability.  However, in some ways, they replicate the problems we discuss.  This is because the 
idea of selective recruitment, for example, relies on these disputed social networks, group 
memberships, and other contested claims from special interests.  Random selection party addresses 
the representativeness issue, and in its more deliberative forms, helps to surface more fully formed 
preferences.  However, it does not necessarily help to bring forward under-represented views in a 
targeted way.  The implications of the tyranny of authenticity are to have a conversation about the 
value of lived experience in its own right.  If we removed the competition over authenticity by 
recourse to representative claims to wider constituencies, then contributions might be judged on 
their own merits.  This would require a different set of questions to be asked of those who come 
forward who do not wish to make specious claims to represent wider constituencies. In cases where 
 
 
a participant would prefer to avoid assuming a gatekeeping position, what might be more relevant 
questions?  Instead we might ask, for example, what does this experiential expertise tell us that we 
did not know before?  How does it challenge or question established wisdom?  What contribution 
does it make to answering the questions we have asked on this governance issue?       
In our second tyranny, of the assumption of distributed leadership, what are some of the 
implications here?  Most obvious would be an exhortation not to assume which model or models of 
leadership are most suited to the task in hand at any particular point.  More challenging is the need 
to explicitly recognise the possibilities of trade-offs, and discuss what those trade-offs might be.  
Where there is an over-emphasis on procedural considerations at the expense of other important 
aspects of justice – epistemic, distributive - there may need to be re-balancing.  The case for 
procedural justice to take precedence over others types of justice in participatory governance seems 
to have creeped into a dominant position without any explicit negotiation or agreement. These 
claims need to be surfaced, articulated, discussed and re-negotiated where appropriate. 
A tyranny of bottom up is best was the third debate discussed in this paper.  Whether 
indeed bottom up is best or not, under what conditions, to what extent, in what ways are all 
empirical questions. Is it that top down approaches are superior in some contexts, or are there new 
hybrid forms which offer greater potential for some governance outcomes?  We would hope that 
social scientists will want to continue trying to research answers to these questions. The underlying 
analytical implication from this paper is to investigate these questions by emphasising the outcomes 
(including process outcomes) produced.  Then, understanding what institutional logics, sets of actors 
and spaces produced those outcomes in those instances.  The implications are to avoid essentialising 
the goods produced to a specific site, or set of actors.  
Our three tyrannies are the products of particular configurations of circumstances in 
governance: decades of experience of participatory practices, often of poor quality; repeated 
exhortations by formal decision-makers to ‘do’ participation and ostensible government backing for 
initiatives; a developed and crowded marketplace of advisers, organisations and ‘toolkits’ about how 
to do participation, and many high profile ‘good practice’ examples drawn from practices in the UK, 
western Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and NZ, as well as Latin America.   These tyrannies are 
context-specific and contingent.   
Therefore, are they relevant to other governance contexts, such as China?    Chinese 
contexts for participatory governance are different, and also similar, in many ways.  For example, 
although one more distinction is in the type of regime, however, the shape of governance 
 
 
arrangements in China is much more complex than a simple regime classification.  Governance 
structures across contexts operate at multiple layers and overlapping jurisdictions.  As elsewhere, 
there are degrees of decentralisation in China, for example, with direct elections for village 
committees, and formal governance institutions at local level operating alongside and interacting 
with informal institutions (Xu and Yang, 2015).  China has been described as “no exception” to the 
rest of the world in the presence of civic action, such as grassroots activism and NGOs, on 
environmental issues (Martens, 2006, p. 213).  Other differences and similarities exist in cultural 
approaches to political participation (Pye, 1985).   
Some official state support for citizen participation in major decisions is relatively recent, 
such as requirements for citizen participation in urban development specified by the China State 
Council in the National  New-Type  Urbanization  Plan  of 2014, as well as support for citizen 
participation announced in other central government documents from 2003 onwards.  However, 
again, this position is more nuanced, with debates reaching back several decades about forms of 
citizen-initiated participation in governance (Jennings, 1997). And the idea of participation faces 
challenges of cynicism through mis-use, and discrediting by past policy initiatives since the 1940s, 
which although differ in specifics, have aspects in common with non-Chinese experiences.  Some 
scholars have argued that the Chinese Communist Party has been gradually overhauling 
administrative institutions around public management ideas (Pieke, 2012), ideas which would be 
very familiar to a western audience. There are similar questions raised about participation, for 
example the conditions under which institutions are more responsive to citizen inputs acting as “true 
channels of responsiveness”, and circumstances under which quasi-democratic institutions are 
“mere window dressing” (Meng, Pan and Yang, 2017, p.400).  Questions which also span contexts 
include the challenge of capacity building for participation, for both citizens and institutions 
(Plummer and Taylor, 2004). 
It is possible to imagine that these contextual differences, and similarities, might generate 
both some resonances with the tyrannies presented here, as well as some differences.  However, the 
real answer to that question is that each set of governance actors and academics will need to work 
out their own particular and peculiar bugbears or resonances for themselves.  What makes people 
feel weary or cynical, what they feel needs discussion but which is hard to initiate, what they feel is a 
misunderstanding that has become hard to correct, these things will come out of a process of 
reflection for those people involved.  The transferable point is about the principles of persistent 
experimentation and feedback loops in participatory practice.   
 
 
Similarly, there are questions about the extent to which tyrannies of practice and thinking 
are particularly prone to take hold in the realm of participation practices.  How relevant are these 
issues to other sorts of practices?   Established and routinised practices in any profession, network, 
or organisation are powerful because they are core parts of what constitutes structures and 
institutions.  Alongside formal rules and informal practices, institutions are also formed of a set of 
dominant narratives, used to both articulate and generate ways of thinking about ‘how things are 
done round here’ (Richardson, Durose and Dean, 2018).  A quick glance at other fields is therefore 
extremely likely to reveal their own context-specific tyrannies. 
Whether changes to practices would be any better than what exists is anyone’s guess.  
Participation is not a cookbook (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987, p. 207).  Incompleteness is a positive 
feature in participation, that is, where options for how to deal with an issue are not fully worked out 
in advance. Incompleteness rules in uncertainty, flexibility and developmental change (Durose and 
Richardson, 2016).  Key amongst conditions for effective participatory governance are self-
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